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STATE1\1ENT OF CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Appellant Walco, Inc. ("Walco") was one of two responders to Idaho County's request 
for proposals ("RFP") for a solid waste collection contract. Walco claimed that the RFP was 
actually a request for competitive bids, not proposals; that its "bid" was lowest; and that Idaho 
County wrongfully disclosed Walco's proposal to the other responder, Simmons Sanitation 
Service, Inc. ("Simmons"). Walco thus claimed Idaho County tortiously interfered with 
Walco's prospective economic expectancy and misappropriated trade secrets. The District Court 
dismissed all of W alco' s claims. 
II. District Court Proceedings 
Walco filed a Complaint stating two causes of action against Idaho County: (1) tortious 
interference with prospective economic expectancy; and (2) misappropriation of trade secrets 
under the Idaho Trade Secrets Act, LC. §§ 48-801 to -807 ("ITSA"). (R Vol. 1, p. 9-65.) Idaho 
County and Simmons moved for summary judgment on both causes of action. (R Vol. 3, pp. 
450-89, 511-12, 552-77.) In response, Walco filed its own cross-motion for summary 
judgment. (R Vol. 6, pp. 1226-42, 1246-47.) Walco also withdrew its tortious interference 
claim and specified that the sole alleged trade secrets at issue were its "bid price" and "bid." (R 
Vol. 7, pp. 1504-27, 1528.) 
At the December 20, 2013 hearing on the summary judgment motions, the District Court 
indicated it would be granting summary judgment to Idaho County and Simmons. (R Vol. 7, pp. 
1723-24.) Before the District Court could reduce its ruling to writing, Walco filed a motion for 
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reconsideration. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1728-41.) After additional briefing and a hearing, the District 
Court granted summary judgment to Idaho County and Simmons on all of Walco's claims. (R 
Vol. 8, pp. 1820-36.) Walco filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1838-43.) 
III. Relevant Facts 
Idaho law permits counties to contract for solid waste collection services directly with a 
vendor of the county's choice, with or without using competitive bidding. LC. § 31-4403(6); R 
Vol. 1, p. 11 CJ[ 10. Pursuant to this authority, Idaho County for several decades contracted for 
solid waste disposal services exclusively with Walco and Simmons, each covering different 
portions of the County. In 2002, each firm executed a separate ten-year contract to provide these 
services from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2012. (R Vol. 2, pp. 104-19, 121-37.) 
Walco and Idaho County in 2008 revised their contract retroactive to October 1, 2006 to provide 
Walco, among other things, fuel surcharges and an automatic yearly base rate increase based on 
the Consumer Price Index. (R Vol. 2, pp. 139-50, 152-63.) 
On July 31, 2012, Idaho County and Simmons executed a ten-year renewal contract 
effective January 1, 2013 for Simmons' coverage area. (R Vol. 2, pp. 165-85.) Idaho County 
and Walco, however, could not agree on certain terms of a ten-year renewal contract for Walco's 
coverage area. (R Vol. 1, p. 11 9[CJ[ 7-8.) Walco thus suggested that Idaho County put the 
contract out to bid. (R Vol. 1, p. 11 <J[ 9; R Vol. 2, p. 187.) 
On August 7, 2012, in a final attempt to conclude a contract with Walco, Idaho County 
sent Walco a copy of the recently executed Simmons-area agreement, indicating that Idaho 
County would be willing to enter a similar contract with Walco for its coverage area. (R Vol. 2, 
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pp. 189-209.) Walco rejected the proposed contract and again suggested the contract be put out 
to bid. (R Vol. 2, pp. 211-12.) 
On September 11, 2012, Idaho County approved publication of a request for proposals 
(not a request for competitive bids) with a response deadline of October 12, 2012. (R Vol. 1, p. 
11 <]111 & pp. 24-27; R Vol. 2, pp. 215, 218-37.) The RFP consisted of (a) two pages of general 
proposal information, (b) 16 pages of a proposed contract with two exhibits, and (c) two pages of 
proposed evaluation criteria. (R Vol. 2, pp. 218-37.)1 At the September 11, 2012 meeting, the 
Commissioners announced publicly that the proposals would be reviewed on October 15 and 
discussed at their meeting on October 16. (R Vol. 2, p. 215.) No party objected to the intended 
public review and discussion of the proposals. (R Vol. 2, p. 96 <JI 5; R Vol. 3, pp. 454 <JI 4, 458 
<J[ 4,516 <J[ 4.) 
On the October 12, 2012 response deadline, the office of Idaho County Recorder, Kathy 
Ackerman, received and time stamped two envelopes containing responsive proposals. (R Vol. 
2, pp. 96-97 <JI 6.) Simmons hand delivered its unsealed proposal at 3:04 p.m., and Walco hand 
delivered its sealed proposal at 4:53 p.m. (R Vol. 2, pp. 96-97 <JI 6, pp. 239-40.) Both proposals 
remained in the Recorder's office, and Walco's proposal remained sealed, until Walco's proposal 
1 The County's proposed contract contained, among others, three material terms of relevance 
here. First, the County wanted to retain the right to implement a "recycling surcharge" by which 
the contractor might in the future rebate the County (on a per-ton basis) for any reduction in 
collected waste resulting from the removal of recyclable materials from the solid waste stream. 
(R Vol. 2, pp. 229-30 §§ 11.2, 11.3.) Second, the County intended to continue to allow for 
annual base rate increases based on changes to the Consumer Price Index. (R Vol. 2, p. 226 
§ 7 .1.) Third, the County was willing to continue paying the fuel surcharge agreed to in 2008, 
provided that the County would, in tum, continue to receive a fuel credit for decreases to fuel 
prices. (See R Vol. 2, p. 227 § 7.2.) 
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was unsealed and Simmons' proposal was opened on October 15, 2012 in a public meeting 
attended by all three County Commissioners, Ackerman, and representatives of Walco. (R Vol. 
3, p. 546 <J[<J[ 7-8.) 
Walco recorded the 20-minute October 15, 2012 public Commissioners' meeting at 
which the proposals were opened and discussed. (R Vol. 3, p. 464 (audio recording of October 
15, 2012 Commissioners' meeting).) At no time during the October 15 meeting did Walco or 
any other party object to the proposals being opened in public or to the base price in each 
proposal being announced. (Id.; R Vol. 3, pp. 533 <j[ 5,537 <j[ 5, 541-42 <j[ 5, 546 <j[ 8.) 
The recording reflects that, after calling the October 15 meeting to order, Commissioner 
Brandt unsealed the proposals in the order they were submitted, announced the base price of 
each, and asked the clerk to copy the proposals for the Commissioners. (R Vol. 3, p. 464, at time 
stamp 1: 15.) Several minutes of small talk ensued until the clerk returned with photocopies of 
the proposals. (Id. at time stamp 5:18 (Commissioner Brandt referring to copies "hot off the 
press").) 
The Commissioners reviewed the proposals silently for several more minutes until 
Commissioner Rockwell and Walco representatives began discussing similarities and differences 
between Walco's existing contract and its newly proposed contract. (Id. at time stamp 9:12.) 
The remainder of the meeting was a discussion of key terms of both parties' proposals, all 
without Walco's two representatives objecting to the discussion occurring in a public meeting. 
(See generally R Vol. 3, p. 464.) At no point did any Walco representative refuse to answer 
questions or request that the Commissioners stop discussing the proposals. (See generally id.) 
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The base prices proposed were $77,202 per month for Simmons and $87,000 per month 
for Walco. (R Vol. 2, pp. 242, 247.) Simmons' proposal was one page long. (R Vol. 2, p. 242.)2 
Walco's proposal was more elaborate - but also proposed an entirely different contract than the 
one proposed by the County with its RFP. (See R Vol. 2, pp. 247, 255-67.)3 
On October 16, 2012, at a regularly scheduled public meeting of the County Commis-
sioners, both Simmons and Walco discussed their proposals at length and in detail, including 
discussing material terms of both Walco's and Simmons' proposals. (See R Vol. 2, p. 274; R 
Vol. 5, pp. 958, 968-1006.)4 
At no time was Simmons allowed to "reconstruct his bid amount" as Walco repeatedly 
asserts without citation to the record. (See, e.g., Appellant's Br. 12.) Rather, the commissioners, 
as guided by their attorney, delayed choosing which party to negotiate with, based on Walco's 
2 Simmons proposed a base rate and only one material deviation from the pricing terms proposed 
by the Commissioners: an additional per-ton charge for waste exceeding 4,500 tons per year. 
(See R Vol. 2, p. 242 (Simmons proposal agreeing "to perform collection of solid waste per 
Idaho Counties (sic) proposal specifications"); R Vol. 2, pp. 220-32 (RFP with proposed 
contract labeled "proposal specifications").) 
3 Walco opted to propose a flat 5% per year "cost of living" increase to its base rate in lieu of 
fuel surcharges or increases based upon the Consumer Price Index. (R Vol. 2, pp. 247, 260 
§ 7.1.) Walco thus did not allow for decreases in fuel costs and wanted a 5% cost-of-living 
increase even if the relevant Consumer Price Index changed less than 5%. Most notably, 
Walco's agreement did not allow for the possibility of a future recycling surcharge. (Compare R 
Vol. 2, p. 262 § 11.1, with Vol. 2, pp. 229-30 §§ 11.2, 11.3.) Walco thus rejected all three of the 
County's material proposed terms described above in footnote 1. 
4 The record includes audio recordings of the relevant meetings, which Walco attended, 
recorded, and disclosed in discovery. (R Vol. 3, p. 464 (October 15 meeting); R Vol. 5, p. 958 
(October 16 and 23 meetings).) Partial transcripts (with several omissions and "inaudible" 
notations) are also in the record. (R Vol. 5, pp. 960-68 (October 15 meeting), 968-1006 
(October 16 meeting), 1006-56 & 1072-85 (October 23 meeting).) 
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objections and Walco's insistence that Simmons give more information before the County enter 
negotiations with Simmons. 
As the recordings and exchange quoted below (from the October 16 meeting) 
demonstrate, and as the District Court's opinion summarizes (R Vol. 8, pp. 1823-24, 1833): 
(1) the Commissioners spent more than three hours in their October 16 and 23 public meetings 
discussing the proposals with Walco and Simmons; (2) the Commissioners acceded to Walco's 
requests that they not begin contract negotiations before more closely comparing the two 
proposals to ensure the base rates were not effectively identical; (3) the Commissioners followed 
their attorney's (Mr. MacGregor's) advice to wait one week (until October 23) to consider the 
two proposals and gather more information before voting to begin contract negotiations with 
either party; and (4) Walco's representative, Patrick Holman, conceded that Simmons may end 
up having a lower net cost: 
COMMISSIONER BRANDT: Okay. I see we need to crunch a lot more 
numbers. 
MR. HOLMAN: After all this Robert may still be lower, but I just wanted to 
make sure all the numbers are considered before you get to an awarding process 
because I don't want to know that we didn't let you know where he possibly 
might be without us at least defending our side and saying where our number is. 
So he may still come out lower after you're done crunching. I just didn't want it 
to be 77,000 as compared to 87,000 as a black and white number. 
MR. MACGREGOR: I would say table it for a month -- I mean, for a week -- for 
a week and crunch some of the numbers. 
(R Vol. 5, p. 993 LL. 19-25, p. 994 LL. 1-7.) 
At one point during the October 23 meeting, when Idaho County's counsel, Kirk 
MacGregor, told Walco's representatives he believed they could make a new or revised proposal 
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if they wished to, they balked and then, as only the audio recording fully demonstrates, said 
nothing as several seconds of silence passed. (R Vol. 5, p. 958 (recording labeled Ex. C.1 at time 
stamp 55:01 to 55:26).)5 Walco did not then or at any time after October 23 accept Mr. 
MacGregor's advice to offer a different proposal or lower price. Instead, they had their lawyer 
write protest letters (R Vol. 2, pp. 276-79; R Vol. 6, pp. 1419-22) and then waited several 
months to sue Idaho County and Simmons. 
At the October 23, 2012 Commissioners' meeting, a lengthy discussion ensued about the 
two proposals, after which the Commissioners voted to enter negotiations with Simmons. (R 
Vol. 2, pp. 288-89.)6 On November 30, 2012, the Commissioners approved and executed the 
contract with Simmons, to take effect on January 1, 2013. (R Vol. 2, pp. 302-24.) 
On January 7, 2013, Walco filed a Notice of Tort Claim. (R Vol. 2, pp. 369-70.) On 
February 19, 2013, Idaho County denied the tort claim and explained its reasoning. (R Vol. 2, 
pp. 372-73.) Walco filed its Complaint on March 25, 2013. (R Vol. 1, pp. 9-65.) On May 29, 
2014, the District Court entered a decision granting summary judgment and a judgment 
5 Walco has previously asserted, completely contrary to its own recording, that "the 
Commissioners decidedly did not and would not allow Walco" to modify its proposal or propose 
a new price. (R Vol. 7, p. 1525.) Idaho County addressed this fabrication in briefing before the 
District Court. (R Vol. 7, p. 1501.) 
6 At the October 30, 2012 Commissioners' meeting, Simmons, among other things, agreed to 
increase its annual tonnage cap from 4,500 tons to 4,632 tons before triggering a per-ton charge. 
(R Vol. 2, p. 292.) The contract was discussed at the November 6 and 27 meetings, and at the 
latter of these two, the public was invited to (and did) comment on the proposed agreement with 
Simmons and was advised that copies of the proposed contract were available for review. (R 
Vol. 2, pp. 296, 300.) 
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dismissing all of Walco's claims. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1820-36.) Walco timely appealed. (R Vol. 8, 
pp. 1838-43.) 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Idaho County believes the issues on appeal are most accurately stated as follows: 
1. Has Walco waived consideration on appeal of the District Court's separate and 
independent basis for dismissal, i.e., that Walco was estopped from claiming misappropriation, 
because Walco did not identify estoppel as an issue on appeal and has provided this Court no 
argument and authority on the estoppel issue in Walco's opening brief? 
2. Did Walco fail to prove the existence of a trade secret under the ITSA, either 
because its information was readily ascertainable by proper means or because Walco failed to 
take reasonable steps to maintain the secrecy of its allegedly proprietary information? 
3. If Walco has not waived the estoppel issue on appeal, should Walco nonetheless 
be estopped from claiming misappropriation by its conduct before, on, and after the 3 p.m. 
meeting on October 15, 2012? 
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ARGUMENT 
Walco asserts that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment because ( 1) the 
Restatement does not preclude a proposal response or bid from being a trade secret (Appellant's 
Br. 4-7), (2) Walco's proposal response had independent economic value (Appellant's Br. 7-8), 
(3) Walco took reasonable steps to maintain the secrecy of the information contained in its 
proposal response (Appellant's Br. 8-14), and (4) Walco presented circumstantial evidence of 
misappropriation (Appellant's Br. 14-22). 
Part I below addresses Walco failure to challenge the District Court's separate and 
independent basis for dismissal of Walco's trade secrets claim - i.e., that Walco was estopped 
from claiming misappropriation. (See R Vol. 8, pp. 1833-34; Restatement (First) of Torts§ 757 
(1939), cmt. d ("A privilege to disclose or use another's trade secret may arise from the other's 
consent or from other conduct on his part by which he is estopped from complaining.").) 
Part II below addresses Walco's failure to prove the existence of a trade secret. 
Part III below addresses certain of W alco' s irrelevant and unsupported claims and 
allegations, both to clear the record and to demonstrate Walco's willingness to misrepresent the 
facts, without citation to the record, as it has done unapologetically throughout this case. (See R 
Vol. 6, pp. 1428-39, 1498-1502; R Vol. 8, pp. 1778-79.) 
The District Court's judgment should be affirmed because (1) Walco has failed to 
challenge a separate and independent basis for dismissal of its trade secrets claim, (2) Walco 
failed as a matter of law to prove the existence of a trade secret, and (3) Walco is es topped from 
claiming misappropriation. 
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I. WALCO HAS WAIVED AN APPEAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT HOLDING THAT WALCO IS ESTOPPED 
FROM CLAIMING MISAPPROPRIATION. 
The District Court granted summary judgment on Walco's trade secret claim on two 
independent bases. First, Walco failed as a matter of law to maintain the secrecy of the 
information contained in its proposal response. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1827-33.) Second, Walco should 
be estopped from claiming misappropriation because Idaho County had a privilege to disclose 
Walco's information. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1833-34.) 
Two facts make clear that these were separate and independent bases for the District 
Court's judgment. First, the District Court's memorandum decision addressed each issue 
separately under its own heading. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1827, 1833.) Second, the District Court gave 
two separate reasons for concluding that Walco could not establish a prima facie case, 
particularly by including the word "and" in the following passage at the end of the District 
Court's decision: 
Walco's trade secret claim does not establish aprimafacie case, since Walco did 
not make sufficient efforts to maintain confidentiality, and Walco should be 
estopped from asserting a trade secret claim since Idaho County held a privilege 
to use and disclose the information submitted by W alco in the way it was 
submitted. 
(R Vol. 8, p. 1834 (emphasis added).) 
Walco's opening brief does not address the District Court's estoppel ruling. It is not 
listed as an issue on appeal, and estoppel is not the subject of argument or authority anywhere in 
Walco's opening brief. (Indeed, Idaho County cannot find any form of the word "estop" 
anywhere in the brief.) 
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This is fatal to Walco's appeal and is an independent basis for affirming the District 
Court' judgment: "Failure of the appellant to include an issue in the statement of issues required 
by I.A.R. 35(a)(4) will eliminate consideration of that issue on appeal." Kugler v. Drown, 119 
Idaho 687,691 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Even if the estoppel issue could be deemed a "subsidiary issue" fairly included within 
Walco's statements of issues on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(4), Walco has 
waived the estoppel issue by failing to provide argument and authority on the estoppel issue: 
"We will not consider assignments of error not supported by argument and authority in the 
opening brief. A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, 
not just if both are lacking." Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 866 (2012) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
The Court may affirm the District Court on this basis alone, because Walco has waived 
any challenge of this separate and independent basis for granting summary judgment on Walco's 
trade secrets claim. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(h), Idaho County joins Simmons' separate 
argument, presented in its responsive brief, that, if the Court does not deem the estoppel issue 
waived, the District Court nonetheless properly concluded that Walco is estopped from claiming 
misappropriation because of its conduct before, at, and after the 3 p.m. meeting on October 15, 
2012. 
In any event, the District Court's judgment should be affirmed because Walco failed to 
prove the existence of a trade secret. 
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II. WALCO FAILED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A TRADE SECRET. 
The ITSA provides for damages for misappropriation of a trade secret. See I.C. §§ 48-
801 to -807. In Idaho, a "trade secret" is 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, computer 
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other 
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and 
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy. Trade secrets as defined in this subsection are subject to 
disclosure by a public agency according to chapter 3, title 9, Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 48-801(5) (emphasis added).7 
The plaintiff in a misappropriation suit has the burden to establish first that a trade secret 
"actually existed." Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 897 (2010). As this 
Court has made clear, "Without a proven trade secret there can be no misappropriation, even if 
the defendants' action was wrongful." Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 133 Idaho 726, 734 (1999) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Under Idaho law, a "trade secret" does not exist if either the information is "readily 
ascertainable by proper means," LC. § 48-801(5)(a), or the plaintiff made insufficient "efforts" to 
"maintain" the secrecy of its allegedly proprietary information, I.C. § 48-801(5)(b) (emphasis 
added). 
7 For purposes of this appeal only, Idaho County accepts that proposal responses or bids could in 
some cases meet the ITSA's criteria for a trade secret; and that Walco's proposal response may 
have had economic value prior to 3 p.m. on October 15, 2012. 
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To "maintain" something requires ongoing action: to "continue [it] without changing" or 
to "to keep [it] in an existing state (as of repair, efficiency, or validity)" or to "preserve [it] from 
failure or decline." See Merriam-Webster Dictionary ( emphases added), available at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/maintain. 
Idaho County agrees that these definitions do not require Walco's "continuous use" of its 
alleged trade secrets in its ongoing business. (See Appellant's Br. 5, 7.) But the law required 
Walco to continue, keep, or preserve the secrecy of its information: 
Failure to take reasonable steps to prevent gratuitous disclosure of the alleged 
trade secret forfeits any protection. Though absolute secrecy is not required, one 
who claims a trade secret must exercise eternal vigilance in protecting its 
confidentiality. 
Fail-Safe, LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 674 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Wisconsin's 
UTSA statute) (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted) (emphasis added); 
see also Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 488, 493 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1994) (applying Georgia's UTSA statute) ("Under the circumstances presented, Equifax 
failed to take reasonable steps to ... ensure the continuing secrecy of the information" (underline 
added).) 
Courts in UTSA jurisdictions like Idaho routinely grant and affirm summary judgment 
based upon the plaintiffs failure as a matter of law to maintain the secrecy of its allegedly 
proprietary information. See, e.g., Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 
890, 901-03 (Minn. 1983), cited in Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 734; Sitco, Inc. v. Agco Corp., No. 
CV-05-073-EBLW, 2006 WL 908065, at *1-2 (D. Idaho April 7, 2006) (Judge Winmill granting 
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summary judgment because plaintiff "failed to protect the information" by having shared it 
"without any restriction"); see also, e.g., Fail-Safe, 674 F.3d at 893-94 (applying Wisconsin's 
UTSA statute); Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1332-37 (N.D. 
Ga. 2007) (confidentiality agreements, password protection, and other affirmative measures 
insufficient under the circumstances); Stargate Software Int'l, Inc. v. Rumph, 482 S.E.2d 498, 
502 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) ("As a matter of law, given the circumstances, Stargate's efforts were 
not reasonable to maintain secrecy of any trade secrets concerning the Rayonier projects."). 
The District Court here analyzed Walco's efforts by reference to California jury 
instructions. (R Vol. 8, pp. 1828-29.) That analysis highlighted the efforts that would normally 
be present in a trade secrets case and that Walco did not take - e.g., confidentiality warnings, 
employee agreements, restricted access based on a business need to know, confidentiality 
agreements, general and specific measures, and other available measures the holder of the 
information could have but did not take. (Id.) Idaho County does not repeat here the District 
Court's analysis (R Vol. 8, pp. 1828-32), but instead focuses on the only efforts Walco alleges 
meet its burden. These are the same efforts it asserted in the District Court. 
Walco asserts it made three efforts to "maintain" the secrecy of its proposal: (1) sending 
its June 7, 2012 letter; (2) sealing the envelope containing its proposal; and (3) objecting on and 
after October 16, 2012 to the proposal review process. (Appellant's Br. 9-14.) 
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A. Walco's Efforts to Maintain Secrecy Were Insufficient In Light of Walco's 
Undisputed Knowledge Its Proposal Would Be Opened In Public. 
Each of Walco's asserted "efforts" to maintain secrecy is discussed below, but each must 
be analyzed in light of four key facts. 
First, Walco does not dispute that the meeting at 3 p.m. on October 15, 2012 at which 
Walco's proposal was first unsealed was a "public" meeting. Walco's briefing in this case 
acknowledged the proposals were opened "in a public meeting." (R Vol. 7, p. 1507.) And, 
Walco's representatives in deposition agreed it was a "public" meeting. (R Vol. 5, p. 1097, at 
40:11-14, p. 1115, at 5:16-6:16.) 
Second, Walco asserts its information was misappropriated after the proposals were 
opened at the public meeting at 3 p.m. on October 15, 2012. (See, e.g., Appellant's Br. 12; R 
Vol. 7, p. 1504, 1505, 1507, 1511, 1517-18, 1529.) Walco does not argue, and no facts suggest, 
that anyone opened or misappropriated Walco's RFP response before it was unsealed and opened 
at the October 15, 2012, public meeting. 
Third, Walco never disputed in the District Court that Walco knew at the time it prepared 
and submitted its proposal that it would be opened in public. Idaho County asserted - and 
Walco never contradicted with admissible evidence - that the County announced on September 
11, 2012 that the proposals would be opened and discussed in public on October 15 and October 
16. (R Vol. 3, pp. 554-55 (citing four declarations in the record at R Vol. 2, p. 96 CJ[ 5; R Vol. 3, 
pp. 454 CJ[ 4, 458 CJ[ 4, 516 CJ[ 4).) It would have been difficult for Walco to oppose this evidence, 
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because Walco's actions proved that it knew where and when to show up on October 15 for the 
proposal opening. 
Fourth, the definition of a "trade secret" in Idaho Code § 48-801(5)(b) (quoted above) 
expressly notes trade secrets are subject to disclosure by a public agency. Indeed, Walco's 
representative, Dorothy Walker, requested and received Simmons' proposal by a public records 
request on October 17, 2012, two days after the proposals were opened and discussed in public 
and one day after they were discussed in further detail at the Commissioners' weekly public 
meeting. (See R Vol. 5, pp. 1149-50.) 
These four facts serve two relevant purposes: first, they demonstrate that both Walco's 
and Simmons' proposals were "readily ascertainable by proper means" after 3 p.m. on October 
15, 2012, because they were in the public domain, see I.C. § 48-801(5)(a); and, second, they 
provide relevant "circumstances" for evaluating Walco's wholly inadequate "efforts" to maintain 
the secrecy of its proposal response, see I.C. § 48-801(5)(b). 
B. Walco's June 7 Letter Did Not Address Its October 12 Proposal. 
Walco asserts its letter of June 7, 2012 constitutes an effort to maintain the secrecy of 
information contained in a proposal response submitted over four months later on October 12, 
2012. (Appellant's Br. 9.) The letter withdrew Walco's offer to contract with the County and 
made a blanket "request that any proprietary information held by the county be retained by the 
county and treated as exempt under the Publics Records Act." (R Vol. 2, p. 187.) 
The letter did not identify any "proprietary information," much less an RFP response that 
did not then exist and would not exist for four months. (See id.) It referred to "information 
-21-
held" in the present tense, i.e., as of June 7, 2012, not all information the County ever received in 
the future. (See id.) The letter could not have identified information that was not yet in 
existence. 
Walco's October 12 proposal made no reference to the June 7 letter. Walco did not 
accompany its proposal with a letter that repeated its June 7 request. And Walco did not mention 
the June 7 letter on October 12 or 15 (i.e., before or during the public proposal opening meeting). 
The District Court rejected Walco's post hoc attempt to focus the vague request made by the 
June 7 letter. (R Vol. 8, p. 1830 n.2.) This Court should as well. 
Walco advances its argument by insisting - without citation to the record - that this 
Court should credit what Walco "intended," "anticipat[ed]," "expected," and "understood" about 
the proposal review process. (Appellant's Br. 10-11.) Walco asserted this argument about its 
"reasonable expectations" for the first time on reconsideration, without submitting any additional 
affidavits or evidence regarding Walco's subjective intentions, anticipations, expectations, or 
understandings about what the RFP said or meant. (See R Vol. 8, pp. 1736-37, 1766-70.) As 
discussed more fully in subsection E below, the Court should disallow this argument because it is 
not supported by evidence in the record and, regardless, is belied by the facts. 
Walco's subjective expectations have nothing to do with whether a letter written four 
months before a submission to a public agency maintains the secrecy of that later submission. 
The June 7 letter cannot have constituted a reasonable effort to maintain the secrecy of Walco's 
October 12 proposal or price after the proposal was opened and discussed in public on October 
15 with Walco's consent. 
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C. Walco's Sealed Envelope Did Not Maintain Secrecy Once Unsealed. 
Idaho County does not dispute that Walco sealed the envelope in which Walco submitted 
its proposal. Idaho County, however, does not concede that the seal maintained any secrets after 
it was broken shortly after 3 p.m. on October 15. 
1. Once the Seal Is Broken. the Effort Is of No Consequence. 
If sealing an envelope constitutes a sufficient effort to maintain secrecy, it only does so 
until the envelope is unsealed. When the seal is broken, the seal protects nothing. Some other 
"effort" is necessary to maintain any secret inside. Something inside or on the envelope must 
further indicate that particular information is proprietary or confidential. Else, information in 
each of the hundreds of sealed envelopes Idaho County or any other public agency receives 
every month could be asserted to constitute trade secrets merely by virtue of the information's 
delivery in a sealed envelope. 
Walco could have placed any proprietary documents or information inside a separate 
envelope inside the main envelope and stamped it "CONTAINS TRADE SECRETS" or 
"PROPRIETARY AND CONFIDENTIAL." Then the breaking of the seal on the outside 
envelope might not destroy the further effort taken to highlight the existence of secret 
information inside the envelope. Walco did not stamp any pages or information in any way. 
Indeed, Walco did not even stamp the main envelope itself. Sealing its envelope did not 
maintain any secrecy after its envelope was unsealed. 
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2. An Envelope Submitted to a Public Agency Especially Must Be Marked 
as Containing Alleged Trade Secrets. 
The above analysis is especially applicable when the submitting party knows the 
envelope will be unsealed in a public meeting by a public entity. 
No provision of Idaho law declares that proposals or bids constitute trade secrets, as 
Walco continues to argue. (See, e.g., Appellant's Br. 9 (quoting LC. § 9-340D and asserting "as 
the statute expressly indicates, Walco's bid is a trade secret that is exempt from public 
disclosure").) Idaho's public records law merely exempts from disclosure any trade secrets 
"contained in" proposals, see I.C. § 9-340D(l) - not all "sealed bids and requests for 
proposals," as Walco falsely asserted in the proceedings below (see R Vol. 7, p. 1527) and 
suggests here. 
Walco went to inordinate lengths in the District Court to prove that Idaho County's RFP 
was in the form of a request for competitive bids, a position Walco maintains. (Appellant's Br. 
2; see, e.g., R Vol. 6, pp. 1226-41, 1423-40; R Vol. 7, pp. 1532-50.) This issue is not on 
appeal. All that matters on appeal is that, as the District Court noted (see R Vol. 8, p. 1833), if 
Walco is correct, it loses its trade secrets case, because all competitive bids must be opened in 
public. See LC. §§ 67-2805(3)(a)(v), 67-2805(3)(b)(ix), 67-2806(2)(e). No Idaho statute 
declares that proposals or bids constitute trade secrets. They may contain trade secrets, which 
must be identified by the proposer or bidder. 
Walco cites Florida Code§ 119.071. (Appellant's Br. 11.) The Florida statute Walco 
cites provides more protection for RFP responses than Idaho's statute, because it exempts entire 
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RFP responses from disclosure for a number of days, not just trade secrets "contained in" 
proposals, which is all that Idaho Code§ 9-340D(l) exempts. 
Regardless, a plaintiff cannot have taken reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of 
information when the plaintiff submits documents to a public agency that is subject to a public 
records law without marking the documents confidential: "[T]he failure to identify information 
furnished to a state agency as putatively exempt from public disclosure effectively destroys any 
confidential character it might otherwise have enjoyed as a trade secret." SePRO Corp. v. 
Florida Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 839 So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The court 
reasoned: 
The trade secret owner who fails to label a trade secret as such, or otherwise to 
specify in writing upon delivery to a state agency that information which it 
contends is confidential and exempt under the public records law is not to be 
disclosed, has not taken measures or made efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain the information's secrecy. 
Id. at784.8 
The court's reasoning has particular force in Idaho. The legislature amended the 
definition of a "trade secret" in the ITSA in 1990 when it enacted the public records law to 
specifically reference the potential public disclosure of trade secrets. See Idaho Session Laws 
1990, ch. 213, § 68. Idaho Code § 48-801(5), quoted above at page 17, specifically defines a 
"trade secret" as "subject to disclosure by a public agency" under "chapter 3, title 9, Idaho 
8 Walco's attempt to shift the burden of identifying and maintaining Walco's trade secrets from 
itself to Idaho County fails as a matter of law. Walco has provided no legal authority for the 
proposition that Idaho public agencies have an obligation to identify another's unidentified 
proprietary information and apply public records exemptions to it. 
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Code," the chapter that includes the public records law. Idaho law places holders of alleged 
trade secrets on as much notice as possible that they must identify and "maintain" the secrecy of 
any information submitted to a public entity subject to the public records law. Walco failed to do 
either of these things. 
3. Walco Did Nothing After Its Envelope Was Unsealed to Maintain 
Secrecy. 
After Walco's envelope was unsealed at the beginning of the 20-minute public meeting 
on October 15, 2012, Walco did nothing to indicate it believed anything in the unsealed envelope 
constituted a trade secret. (See R Vol. 3, pp. 533 <J[ 5, 53715, 541-4215, 546 <_I[ 8.) As the audio 
recording proves beyond dispute, Walco's representatives, Patrick and Marietta Holman, 
participated actively without objection as its proposal was unsealed, summarized aloud, 
photocopied, and discussed openly in public. (See R Vol. 3, p. 464 (recording); see also R Vol. 
5, pp. 961-68 (partially transcribed transcript).) 
The Holmans willingly answered questions revealing details of Walco's proposal without 
requesting that further discussions occur in private. They knew immediately that Walco's 
monthly base rate was at least apparently $10,000 higher than Simmons', and they heard several 
details about Simmons' proposal. (See, e.g., R Vol. 5, p. 963 LL. 23-25, p. 964 LL. 1-3 
(revealing Simmons' proposed tonnage cap to Walco).) They did not ask that Simmons not be 
given the details about Walco's proposal that they had just been given about Simmons' proposal. 
Commissioner Brandt twice repeated the September 11 announcement that the 
Commissioners would discuss the proposals the next day, October 16, during their regularly 
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scheduled public meeting. (R Vol. 5, p. 965, LL. 2-4, p. 967 L. 24 - p. 968 L. 8.) The Holmans 
did nothing to prevent any of Walco's information from being discussed there. Rather, they 
agreed to come to the public meeting on October 16 to discuss it further. (R Vol. 5, p. 968, L. 1.) 
Walco did nothing whatsoever on October 15 to maintain the secrecy of anything inside 
Walco's unsealed envelope, and that is all that matters: at that moment in time, any allegedly 
proprietary information ceased as a matter of law to be a trade secret. 
These facts also refute W alco' s repackaged argument from proceedings below that they 
did not expect the RFP responses to be opened in public and shared among proposing parties. 
(Appellant's Br. 10.) No party that watches its (and its competitor's) proposal be unsealed, 
photocopied, reviewed, and discussed in a public meeting can possibly assert that it reasonably 
believed the initial review had happened or was happening in private. 
D. Walco's Arguments About Its Objections On and After October 16, 2012 Are 
Irrelevant. 
Walco asserts, as it has throughout this case, that its objections on and after October 16 to 
the procurement process - and in particular to what Walco misleadingly describes as Simmons' 
opportunity to "rehabilitate" or "reconstruct" its proposal - constitute efforts to maintain 
secrecy of information made public on October 15 with Walco's consent. (Appellant's Br. 12-
13; see also R Vol. 7,p.1517.) 
But holders of trade secrets fight suspected misappropriation by seeking injunctions to 
prevent further disclosure or damage, not by speaking freely about their trade secrets in 
successive public meetings. If Walco really thought it had a trade secret, Walco could easily 
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have sought an injunction in the District Court to enjoin the procurement process until a court 
could determine if Walco's information had been or was being misappropriated: 
Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the 
court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, 
but the injunction may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in 
order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from 
the misappropriation. 
I.C. § 48-802; see also JustMed, Inc. v. Byce, 600 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 
I.C. § 48-802).9 Instead, Walco waited for the entire procurement process to play out and then 
sued the respondents for damages on two meritless and post hoc theories. 10 
The earliest possible time that Walco arguably could be considered to have objected was 
at the meeting on October 16, 2012, a day after Walco's information ceased to be a trade secret. 
At the public meeting on October 16, the Holmans again discussed their proposal, Simmons' 
proposal, the parties' differing views on consolidation, Simmons' per-ton charge for excess 
tonnage, fuel surcharges, and more - before ever mentioning vaguely that Simmons' proposal 
9 Walco could also have sought injunctive relief or a writ if it thought it was subject to a faulty 
procurement process (whether via competitive bid or RFP). See, e.g., Dana, Larson, Roubal & 
Assocs. v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Canyon County, 124 Idaho 794, 800 (Ct. App. 1993). ("No 
equitable remedies such as an injunction, writ of mandamus, or writ of prohibition were sought 
to compel the respondents to act as desired."). 
1° For these reasons, Idaho County respectfully disagrees with the District Court that the law may 
provide no remedy or may have shortcomings for a plaintiff like Walco. (See Appellant's Br. 
21-22.) Just because Walco has tried to force-fit its case into a trade secrets cause of action that 
is legally flawed does not mean it had no remedy. Walco's current counsel represented Walco 
before, during, and after the procurement process and wrote several letters to the County 
threatening legal action. (See R Vol. 2, pp. 276-79 (October 22 letter); R Vol. 6, pp. 1419-22 
(October 26 letter).) Only Walco and its counsel know why it did not follow through and seek 
an injunction in October 2012. But there can be no argument that Walco had no remedy for its 
perceived wrongs. 
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was "not really a fair bid." (See R Vol. 5, pp. 968-85, 985 LL. 19-23, p. 958 (recording labeled 
Ex.Bat time stamp 20:10). This was a day after the October 15 meeting and 20 minutes into the 
meeting on October 16. And, even after that, the Holmans continued to discuss the details of 
Walco's proposal. (See, e.g., R Vol. 5, p. 987 L. 19-p. 988 L. 18.) 
Walco provides no authority in law or logic for the proposition that post hoc protestations 
can transform into trade secrets information made public with the party's consent. One cannot 
"re-maintain" secrecy; once secrecy is lost, it is lost. 
This assertion is simply an attempt to fit into a trade secrets framework Walco's claim 
that Idaho County's "process" effectuated a misappropriation of Walco's base rate so that 
Simmons could undercut it. (See Appellant's Br. 19-21; R Vol. 7, p. 1518.) Walco's claim 
remains as legally and factually flawed as it was in the District Court. 
1. Walco Reverses the Relevant Legal Analysis. 
Walco's "process" argument turns on its head this Court's fundamental rule of trade 
secrets law: "Without a proven trade secret there can be no misappropriation, even if the 
defendants' action was wrongful." Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 734 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Basic American makes plain that public information does not become a trade secret by 
virtue of its wrongful use. It could not, because as soon as it is public, it is "readily ascertainable 
by proper means," I.C. § 48-801(5)(a), such as by a public records request. 11 All other facts are 
11 Indeed, Walco requested and obtained Simmons' proposal by a public records request just a 
day later on October 17, 2012. (See R Vol. 5, pp. 1149-50.) 
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irrelevant, no matter how awful Walco may misleadingly attempt to make them appear: "If the 
nonmoving party cannot make a showing on elements essential to his claims, there can be no 
genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 
on the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." McGilvray v. 
Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39, 42 (2001) (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Walco's argument reverses the legal analysis and is a proper subject for dismissal on 
summary judgment, as confirmed by a case Walco cites. See CDC Restoration & Constr., LC v. 
Tradesmen Contractors, LLC, 274 P.3d 317, 324-25 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (refusing to "create a 
presumption that trade secret status may be established by use alone" because this would 
"collapse" the separate statutory analyses of existence and misappropriation). 
2. Simmons Did Not Need to and Did Not Rehabilitate Its Proposal. 
Walco's substantive argument about Simmons "rehabilitating" its proposal is 
unsustainable partly because there is no genuine dispute that the base rates were not the only 
element of the parties' proposed price. (See R Vol. 6, pp. 1438-39.) 
Walco's proposed invariable 5% annual, compounding base rate increase alone 
eviscerates Walco's argument that Simmons' and Walco's prices were effectively identical or 
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that Walco's was lower. 12 Even if Walco's assertion that Simmons "quoted" or "revealed" his 
fuel surcharge to be "$7,900" was true, it would not matter, because the effective first-year base 
rate was only one aspect of the pricing under evaluation. The effective first-year base rates were 
not determinative, because it was objectively reasonable to estimate, as one commissioner did, 
that Walco's price would quickly grow much larger than Simmons' after the first year: 
COMMISSIONER ROCKWELL: The five percent, Marietta, over a 10 year 
period is an increase up to $141,000 in a 10 year contact. That would be your 
base, the 141,000. So we moved from 87,000 to 141,000 on a five percent 
required increase. That for me looking at the numbers is a very tough number to 
get over. It's 60,000 more than what we're looking at today. 
MS. HOLMAN: That was the proposal. 
(R Vol. 5, p. 1053, LL. 5-12.) 
Walco made its proposal, and it was too expensive. Nobody needed to appropriate 
anything of Walco's or "reconstruct" anything for Walco to lose out to Simmons. For this same 
reason, Walco can have suffered no damages, because everything the Commissioners needed to 
12 For example, in an October 22, 2012 letter to Idaho County, Walco's attorney asserted that 
Idaho County would pay Simmons more than it would pay Walco, in part because Simmons' 
monthly fuel surcharge would be "at least $7,900," which he noted would total $85,102 when 
added to Simmons' proposed monthly base rate of $77,202. (See R Vol. 2, p. 278.) This stood 
in contrast to Walco's own recent fuel surcharges for the same coverage area, which had totaled 
only $11,556 for the entire quarter ending September 30, 2012, an average of only $3,852 per 
month. (See R Vol. 2, pp. 281-85.) As documented in the District Court proceedings, 
experience confirmed that Walco's position on these figures was always absurd and not based on 
history, likely experience, or reality. (See, e.g., R Vol. 7, pp. 1493-94 n.4. (citing record 
evidence of actual 2013 costs and tonnage).) 
Regardless, the final contract Simmons signed contained no material change to the 
variable fuel surcharge provision based upon the 2005 per-gallon rate proposed by Idaho County 
and accepted by Simmons. (Compare R Vol. 2, pp. 226-27 §§ 7.1-7.2, with R Vol. 2, pp. 311 
§§ 7.1-7.2.) The number $7,900 is nowhere to be found in the relevant contract and is totally 
irrelevant to this case. 
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reject Walco's offer to raise its rate invariably 5% every year was contained in Walco's proposal. 
Without damages Walco has no case under the ITSA. See J.C.§ 48-803. 
There is no logical or legal merit to Walco's assertion that post hoc efforts can 
"maintain" a secret that has already ceased to exist by the party's own consent. 
E. Walco's "Expectations" Are Not In the Record and Are Contradicted By Its 
Own Actions. 
Walco asserted for the first time on reconsideration - and reasserts in different terms to 
this Court - that Walco "reasonably expected that its bid information would be kept secret, at 
least until all bids were complete," based in part on language in the RFP. (See R. Vol. 8, pp. 
1736-37; see also Appellant's Br. 10-11.) Walco advances its argument by insisting-without 
citation to the record - that this Court should credit what Walco "intended," "anticipat[ed]," 
"expected," and "understood" about the RFP process. (Appellant's Br. 10-11.) The Court 
should disallow this argument because it is not supported by evidence in the record. Regardless, 
Walco's actions were inconsistent with its asserted "expectation," so Walco is not entitled to any 
reasonable inference for summary judgment purposes. 
1. These Factual Assertions Are Not In the Record. 
Walco noted that it was not required to, and chose not to, provide any new affidavits in 
support of its motion for reconsideration. (R Vol. 8, p. 1730.) Walco's new assertions regarding 
what it expected are factual assertions of its counsel by way of argument in a brief not verified 
by any party with personal knowledge of Walco's expectation when it submitted its proposal on 
October 12, 2012. These are not facts in any affidavit, and they are not facts proffered or tested 
in deposition. 
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These baseless factual assertions should not be considered by the Court: "Upon a motion 
for summary judgment a court will consider only that material contained in affidavits or 
depositions which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at trial." 
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869 (1969) (emphasis added); see also 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 271, 272 (2012) (citing Petricevich twice for the 
fundamental proposition that "in order to withstand summary judgment, the plaintiff must 
present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could rely" and cannot rely on "their own 
conclusory assertion[s]"). 
As Idaho County repeatedly demonstrated in its briefing in the District Court, Walco has 
throughout this litigation asserted facts not in the record and failed to cite to the record for 
material factual assertions. (See Appellant's Br. 3, 8, 10, 12, 20; R Vol. 6, pp. 1428-39, 1498-
1502; R Vol. 8, pp. 1778-79.) Each party bears "the burden of supporting its argument both 
below and on appeal with citation to the record." Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn 
Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 218 (2008) (emphasis added) (affirming summary judgment 
"on the alternate ground that Commercial failed to provide sufficient facts to survive a motion 
for summary judgment").13 
The Court should disallow Walco's latest attempt to assert facts without a proper basis. It 
is too late for Walco to assert this new factual basis, because any affidavit in support of 
13 In addition, Idaho County requested in the District Court, and continues to request in this 
Court, that the Court not rely on Walco's numerous deposition excerpts without ruling on the 
many objections interposed. (See, e.g., Appellant's Br. 17-18.) 
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reconsideration was required to be filed at the time Walco filed its motion for reconsideration, 
see I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(B), which Walco did not do. 
2. Walco's Claim Is Contradicted By Its Own Actions. 
In any event, for at least four reasons, Walco's newest post hoc argument is completely 
incredible and does not warrant the reasonable inference required to survive summary judgment. 
First, if it were true, Walco would have proffered these facts to contradict Idaho County's 
assertion in its opening summary judgment brief that on September 11, 2012 the County 
announced that the proposals would be opened and discussed in public on October 15 and 
October 16. (See R Vol. 3, pp. 554-55 (citing four declarations in the record at R Vol. 2, p. 96 
CJ[ 5; R Vol. 3, pp. 454 <J[ 4,458 CJ[ 4, 516 <J[ 4).) 
Second, the language of the RFP twice says that Idaho County "may" follow the 
procedures Walco now says relieved it of its statutory obligation to maintain the secrecy of its 
information. (See R Vol. 2, p. 236 (advising that "[p]roposals may be evaluated according to the 
process outlined" in the RFP and that "COUNTY may conduct the evaluation process as 
follows" (emphases added)).) The County reserved the right to allow responders to supplement 
"omissions," "modify the proposal," or submit "an amended proposal." (R Vol. 2, p. 236.) The 
County never promised the procedures Walco relies on. So any reliance was in fact 
unreasonable - especially with regard to information Walco believed to constitute trade secrets 
- until Walco confirmed the process the County would actually use. 
Third, any such expectations, if they existed, were quickly destroyed at 3 p.m. on October 
15, 2012, when Walco: (a) knew where and when to show up for a public Commissioners' 
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meeting; (b) participated without objection as Walco's and Simmons' proposals were opened and 
the parties' base rates were announced; ( c) watched for several minutes as the Commissioners 
reviewed the proposals; and (d) freely answered questions and volunteered information about its 
own proposal. (See generally R Vol. 3, p. 464; R Vol. 5, pp. 965-68.) 
Walco did not before or at that meeting inquire about the process being used, such as by 
asking: Why was its proposal just opened and announced publicly? What is going to be 
discussed the next day at the public Commissioners' meeting? Why isn't this all being done in 
private? 
Fourth, Walco's suggestion that Simmons' RFP response was not "complete" is a straw 
man argument intended to obscure the fact that Walco, not the Defendants, threw a wrench in the 
RFP process. No fact in the record suggests that anyone viewed Walco's RFP response until it 
was opened in public. So there can be no genuine dispute as to the following fact: Before 3 p.m. 
on October 15, 2012, Walco was the only party that knew its RFP response rejected Idaho 
County's key pricing terms and instead proposed a dramatic departure from Idaho County's, 
Walco's, and Simmons' years-old variable pricing structure. (See footnotes 1, 2, 3 above.) 
Only Walco could have known that other proposers who accepted Idaho County's 
proposed variable pricing structure would immediately learn of Walco's very different invariable 
and annually increasing pricing structure. Only Walco could have known that its pricing would 
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render other responders' fuel surcharge estimates as relevant as Walco insisted those estimates 
were during the time Walco sought to discredit Simmons' proposal. 14 
Yet Walco did nothing whatsoever to prevent the public opening and discussion of its 
proposal containing its pricing structure. There is thus no way that Walco's efforts could have 
been reasonable as a matter of law to protect the "secrecy" of its information. Walco's failure is 
fatal to its claim as a matter of law: 
Failure to take reasonable steps to prevent gratuitous disclosure of the alleged 
trade secret forfeits any protection. Though absolute secrecy is not required, one 
who claims a trade secret must exercise eternal vigilance in protecting its 
confidentiality. 
Fail-Safe, LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 674 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Wisconsin's 
UTSA statute) (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
All of this confirms the District Court's observation that Walco's "claims of a trade secret 
violation are in reality an eleventh hour recognition that its submission was being rejected and its 
subsequent efforts to undo that process." (R Vol. 8, p. 1830 n.2) 15 
14 As discussed in footnote 12 above, Idaho County does not concede that fuel surcharge 
estimates were nearly as relevant as Walco insists - because nothing changes the fact that only 
Walco proposed an invariable 5% annual, compounding, automatic base rate increase. This 
pricing element alone rendered irrelevant the small variations in fuel surcharges under the 
historical pricing structure. Even if Simmons had used Walco's information, no reasonable juror 
could conclude that Walco was damaged, because no reasonable juror could conclude that 
Consumer Price Index-based increases would consistently outpace Walco's 5% annual increases. 
15 This observation lays bare Walco's attempt to persuade this Court that the District Court had 
misgivings about its own ruling, or that its ruling was a close call that could easily have gone in 
Walco's favor. (Appellant's Br. 21-22.) The District Court's opinion read as a whole is a 
thorough rejection of Walco's trade secret claim. 
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F. Walco Argued Simmons' Proposal and Price Were Not Trade Secrets. 
In this case, Walco argues only its proposal and base rate were trade secrets; Simmons' 
were not. (See R Vol. 1, p. 13 CJ[ 20.) As discussed above, none were, especially as of their 
public opening with the parties' consent at 3 p.m. on October 15, 2012. 
First, Walco's representative Marietta Holman agreed with Walco's assertion in its 
Complaint that Simmons' proposal and base rate were not trade secrets. (See R Vol. 5, p. 1093, 
at 21:14-22:5.) If Simmons' were not, Walco's were not. 
Second, Walco's representative, Dorothy Walker, requested and received Simmons' 
proposal by a public records request on October 17, 2012, two days after the proposals were 
opened and discussed in public and one day after they were discussed in further detail at the 
Commissioners' public meeting. (See R Vol. 5, pp. 1149-50.) Walco thus acknowledged by its 
action that the proposals were in the public domain. 
Third, on October 22, 2012, Walco's attorney argued to the Commissioners that proposal 
and pricing information was not proprietary: 
[T]he matters intended to be secretly discussed with Mr. Simmons are not 
proprietary in nature. 
If this information is proprietary th[ e ]n the county would have opened 
both bids in executive session, out of public view and would have stated in the bid 
proposal that information of this nature would be treated as proprietary. Walco 
submitted all of this information and it was opened for all to see. Why is Mr. 
Simmons allowed to share information in secret that Walco was required to 
expose to the public? 
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(See R Vol. 2, p. 277.)16 
Fourth, Walco continues in this Court to insist that Simmons' attempt to actually 
maintain the secrecy of some of his information (see footnote 16) is proof that Walco's 
information was still proprietary as well. But the District Court laid bare this assertion at oral 
argument: "And that [Simmons' request] strikes me as the kind of action that should have been 
taken in order to preserve a trade secret if it were, in fact, a trade secret." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 37, LL. 
20-23.) Walco cannot now be credited with Simmons' efforts to protect its own information. 
Walco should be held to its actions and arguments. As the District Court concluded, 
"Walco cannot contend its submission was confidential and at the same time argue its 
competitor's submission was public." (R Vol. 8, p. 1830.) 
G. Walco's Case Law Does Not Help Its Case. 
Walco cites two cases for the proposition that an RFP response or bid can constitute a 
trade secret. (Appellants' Br. 6.) Neither case addresses Idaho law or Walco's facts. Both cases 
involve bids to private entities on private contracts, not to public entities on public contracts, and 
involve the theft of bid information before bids were turned in, not after they were made public 
with the plaintiffs' consent. See CDC Restoration & Constr., LC v. Tradesmen Contractors, 
16 Simmons did not refuse to give his proposal figures in public. Simmons on October 16 only 
requested an executive session if required to show "how" he came up with his final numbers: "If 
you want a total I'll give it to you. If you want to see how I came up with them I want that in 
executive session." (See R Vol. 5, p. 996 LL 1-3 (emphases added).) Mr. Simmons confirmed 
this in his deposition, and Walco's counsel even summarized that view to Mr. Simmons. (See R 
Vol. 6, p. 1394, at 41:16-42:25, p. 1396, at 51:21-52:11.) 
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LLC, 274 P.3d 317, 321-22 fl 2-5, 327-28 <J[ 35 (Utah Ct. App. 2012); Ovation Plumbing, Inc. 
v. Furton, 33 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). 
More relevant is a Minnesota UTSA case cited approvingly by this Court, in which the 
court overturned a trial court's finding of a trade secret because the plaintiff failed to maintain 
the secrecy of its information as a matter of law. See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, 
Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901-03 (Minn. 1983), cited in Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 734. Electro-Craft 
analyzed the reasonable efforts requirement at length in ways relevant to this case. 
The court first held that a plaintiff's intention to keep information secret is irrelevant to 
its efforts: 
The district court found that, even though ECC had no "meaningful security 
provisions," ECC showed an intention to keep its data and processes secret. This 
finding does not bear upon the statutory requirement that ECC use "efforts that 
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain ... secrecy." 
Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 901 (italics in original). 
The court next clarified that a holder of alleged trade secrets must demonstrate a 
"continuing course of conduct" not of using the trade secrets in business, see id., but in asserting 
and maintaining secrecy: 
We acknowledge that ECC took minimal precautions in screening its Handbook 
and publications for confidential information and by requiring some of its 
employees to sign a confidentiality agreement, but these were not enough. 
Id. at 901-02 (footnote omitted). 
Electro-Craft held that the plaintiff's "physical security measures" and "confidentiality" 
procedures were both "fatally lax," id. at 902, and that its confidentiality agreements were - like 
Walco's June 7 letter was - "too vague to apprise the employees of specific 'secrets,"' id. at 
-39-
903. Because the plaintiff was not "ever consistent in treating the information here as secret," 
the court reversed the trial court's findings of fact as clearly erroneous. Id. 
Nearly all trade secrets cases have distinct facts, of course, but a recent Seventh Circuit 
case applying Wisconsin's UTSA statute - and affirming summary judgment on the UTSA 
element of failure to maintain secrecy- practically describes Walco's case: 
None of the information provided by FS to AOS was marked confidential, nor did 
FS make it known that it expected this information to remain confidential. 
Rather, FS volunteered information and willingly cooperated with AOS. 
Fail-Safe, 674 F.3d at 893-94. 
The Fail-Safe court even observed, like the District Court at the December 20, 2013 
hearing, that the defendant took steps to prevent disclosure of its secret information - efforts the 
plaintiff did not take: 
Indeed, FS signed AOS's one-way confidentiality agreement, yet failed to obtain 
similar protection . . . . FS failed to make a modicum of effort to protect the 
confidentiality of its information, a failure that was not reasonable under these 
circumstances. 
Id.; see also supra footnote 16 (discussing Simmons' request for executive session). 
Neither of Walco's cases requires this Court to submit Walco's case to a jury. The above 
facts and law support the conclusion that (1) Walco's claim fails on the efforts to maintain 
secrecy prong of the Idaho statute; (2) Walco was estopped after the October 15 meeting from 
complaining about any use of its allegedly proprietary information; and (3) any reasonable 
expectation Walco may have had about the secrecy of the process failed to be reasonable when it 
did not inquire of the process being used or the status of its or Simmons' information after the 
public discussion of that information at the October 15 meeting. 
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Walco has no case in a UTSA jurisdiction like Idaho, no matter how many different ways 
it frames its argument. The Court should affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment. 
The above analysis is all that is necessary to decide this case, but because Walco makes 
additional baseless arguments, Idaho County addresses some of them below. 
III. W ALCO CONTINUES TO MAKE UNSUBSTANTIATED FACTUAL 
ASSERTIONS AND IRRELEVANT ARGUMENTS. 
Walco repeats to this Court many unsubstantiated assertions, often without citation to the 
record, including ones Idaho County has previously discredited. (See Appellant's Br. 3, 8, 10, 
12, 20; R Vol. 6, pp. 1428-39, 1498-1502; R Vol. 8, pp. 1778-79.) Some merit a response. 
First, as it did in the District Court, Walco misleadingly implies that Skip Brandt's March 
2012 email to Robert Simmons was in response to Walco's June 2012 suggestion that the County 
put the contract out to bid. (See Appellant's Br. 16.) The quoted email was sent in March 2012 
during a time Walco and Simmons were negotiating together for their respective exclusive 
contracts. (See generally R Vol. 6, p. 1312, at 10:19 - p. 1316, at 26:9 (Brandt deposition 
regarding recycling negotiations).) Brandt perceived Simmons to be more constructive than 
Walco in negotiating terms necessary to make each party's exclusive, 10-year contract consistent 
with the County's policy choices. (See R Vol. 6, p. 1314, at 20:1-4, p. 1315, at 24:20-23.) 
As Commissioner Brandt explained in his deposition, the March email was sent in 
response to an email from Walco's counsel refusing to agree to a $7.50 per ton recycling rebate. 
(R Vol. 6, p. 1314, at 19:11-16.) Walco does not tell the Court that Brandt testified twice that he 
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cooled down long before Walco's June 2012 suggestion that the contract be put out to bid. (R 
Vol. 6, p. 1315, at 21:23-22:16, p. 1315, at 24:7-16.) 
The email was sent more than two months before Walco's June 7, 2012 suggestion to put 
the contract out to bid. Walco's use of a March 2012 email to color Brandt's reaction to Walco's 
June 2012 withdrawal from negotiations distorts the record. It also ignores that, despite any 
frustration with Walco, the Commissioners later tried twice to negotiate exclusively with Walco. 
(See R Vol. 5, p.1189; R Vol. 2, pp. 189-209.) 
Second, as it did in the District Court, Walco again falsely asserts that Commissioner 
Brandt requested and shared Sunshine Disposal's "pricing information" with Simmons to assist 
Simmons "in undercutting Sunshine should they elect to bid." (Appellant's Br. 16.) The 
"pricing information" Walco ominously alludes to was not Sunshine Disposal's proprietary 
pricing information. Rather, it was the pricing information of another public entity- Whitman 
County, Washington - to whom Sunshine provides services. (See R Vol. 5, pp. 1207-09 (July 
6 email referring to Whitman County); R Vol. 6, p. 1319, at 39:21 - 40:2 (Brandt advising 
Walco's counsel it was Whitman County's contract pricing information).) 
Walco omits that Brandt stated straightforwardly in his deposition that he sent it to 
Simmons not so that Simmons could undercut Sunshine, but to "show[] him that somebody else 
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is interested in bidding." (R Vol. 6, p. 1320, at 41:5-6.) 17 And, as the documents cited above 
show, the Sunshine emails were exchanged on July 6 -before the Commissioners again offered 
to negotiate exclusively with Walco as permitted by law, and before the Commissioners 
published the RFP. 
Third, Walco cites text messages exchanged between Simmons and Commissioner 
Brandt. (Appellant's Br. 16-17.) One text is almost the best evidence available to prove that 
Brandt did not misappropriate anything: on the day after the proposal deadline of October 12, 
2012, he texted to Simmons: "I would note that I do not no (sic) details." (R Vol. 5, p. 1211.) 
But the last text reproduced by Walco - Brandt asking Simmons to call him when he 
returns from hunting camp ("h c") - was not sent until October 17, after the October 15 public 
proposal opening and the October 16 public meeting at which Walco had discussed its proposal 
at length. (See Appellant's Br. 17; R Vol. 5, p. 1211.) 
Fourth, Walco makes much of the phone calls between Brandt and Simmons shortly after 
the 3 p.m. meeting on October 15. (Appellant's Br. 17-19.) Even if the calls were not 
"according to Hoyle," as the District Court observed (Tr Vol. 1, p. 50, LL. 21-23), Brandt 
explained in deposition that he believed the proposals opened earlier that day made it obvious 
that Simmons was the only party who had accepted the County's proposed contract and at an 
apparently lower price. (See R Vol. 6, p. 1323, at 53:7-25.) Brandt wanted to discuss whether 
17 Brandt's explanation is entirely consistent with Simmons' position that one reason Simmons 
chose to respond to the RFP despite its reluctance to do so was to prevent outside companies 
from coming into the Idaho County market and stealing Walco's and Simmons' market share. 
(See R Vol. 6, p. 1386, at 11: 18 - p. 1387, at 13:5 (Simmons deposition); R Vol. 6, p. 1322, at 
49: 17 - 50:7 (Brandt deposition).) 
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Simmons' small business would have the capacity to provide service for the sizable other half of 
Idaho County. (See R Vol. 6, p. 1323, at 54:18-23, p. 1329, at 78:17-25.) He also asked Robert 
Simmons, who was away hunting, to come to the public meeting to discuss the proposals the 
next day, October 16. (See R Vol. 6, p. 1389, at 21:6-22:5.) 18 None of this is wrongful, much 
less an act of misappropriation, especially given that Walco had just heard Simmons' proposed 
price and contract terms announced earlier that afternoon at the 3 p.m. public meeting. 
The phone calls and texts are nonetheless irrelevant to the legal analysis in this case. No 
trade secret existed after the 3 p.m. meeting on October 15, 2012, and so the analysis ends where 
it began: "Without a proven trade secret there can be no misappropriation, even if the 
defendants' action was wrongful." Basic Am., 133 Idaho at 734 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
18 Walco quotes (without record citation) an objection-laden passage from Simmons' deposition 
to falsely assert that Simmons testified "he and Brandt never discussed Walco's bid." 
(Appellant's Br. 18 (emphasis added).) Simmons' testified clearly that he recalled from Brandt's 
October 15 phone call at least that (1) Walco's base rate was lower "by a long ways," (2) 
Simmons was surprised his base rate was so much lower than Walco's, and (3) he had not 
expected to need to come to the October 16 meeting - but that he did not recall a lot of other 
discussion about the specifics of Walco's proposal. (See R Vol. 6, p. 1389, at 21:6-22:5; see 
also R Vol. 6, p. 1389, at 23:24-24:25, p. 1392, at 36:13-24.) 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the District Court's entry of judgment 
in their favor on all of Walco's claims. 
DATED: January 30, 2015. 
By~)U~-=-0HUA D. MCKARCHER 
Attorneys for Respondent Idaho County 
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